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Æ Transition from a single-
party state socialist system 
to a multi-party 
democracy
Æ Transition from state 
planned economy to free 
market, neoliberal 
capitalism 
Æ Member of the European 
Union since 2004
Systemic changes post-1990
Much of the 1990s characterised by economic and social 
crises and administrative reforms. 
1. Strong neoliberalisation affected disability policies (Mladenov
2016)
± Macro level (changes in social policy, welfare  ‘ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ? ?ĂƵƐƚĞƌŝƚǇ ?
± Micro level (identity construction, increasing individualism and 
consumerism)
2. Strengthening civil society and legislative reforms
± By mid-1990s over 30 thousand NGOs; NGOs often become service 
providers (Tausz 1997, Balazs & Petri 2010)
± Disillusionment in the civil sector, paternalism (Miszlivetz 1997)
± Some legislative changes are achieved by DPOs 
± Legislative reforms: 1993 Education Act, 1998 Disability Act, 2008 UN 
CRPD
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Institutions in the 1990s
 New social policy preserved 
institutions.
 Attempts to create alternatives to 
institutions: group homes. 
 Activism of parents and charities 
driven by discontent.
 Act XXVI of 1998: small group living 
ĨŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞ “ǁŚŽĂƌĞĐĂƉĂďůĞ ?ĂŶĚ
 “ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐĞĚĂŶĚŚƵŵĂŶŝƐĞĚ ?
institutions for those with severe 
disabilities. 
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Institutions in the 2000s
 WŽůŝĐǇĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ “ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? ?
institutions still going strong.
 'ƌŽƵƉŚŽŵĞƐďĞĐĂŵĞ “ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞĚ ? PƐƚƌŝĐƚ
regulation and size requirement (8-14 places).
 EU funding to support deinstitutionalisation and 
community living. 





1. Are investments in deinstitutionalisation and 
community living in ůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞh ?ƐĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ
priorities (social inclusion and anti-
discrimination) and the provisions of the UN 
CRPD in the 2007-2013 period?
2. Are the projects that received funding in line 
with the UN CRPD?
3. How successful actors responsible for managing 
EU funds in Hungary have been in terms of 





 15 semi-structured interviews with national 
policy makers, DPOs, service providers, EU desk 
officers.
 Document analysis of EU and domestic 
framework.
 Photovoice (Wang & Burris 1997) in one 
institution (not presented here).  
Analysis
 Interviews transcribed (not verbatim) and 










Adapted from: Walt and Gilson 1994, p. 354
Context
 Modernisation of institutions on the policy agenda 
for a long time.
 Ratification of the UN CRPD (Article 19) had a clear 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞ,ƵŶŐĂƌŝĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ
to start deinstitutionalisation. However, there are 
some important limitations of the human-rights 
based approach.
 EU funding (not part of a comprehensive policy 
reform, short-term planning). 
 Wider political context: centralisation (away from 
local authorities), funding crisis. 
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UN CRPD as driver behind reforms  W
limitations of the human rights based 
approach
 “The CRPD is not even law in the traditional sense, because it does not tell 
us what to ĚŽŽƌŚŽǁƚŽĚŽŝƚ ? ?(Hungarian government expert)
 “The CRPD is open to interpretations and it is difficult to say that this or 
ƚŚĂƚŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŝƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞZW ?tĞĂƌĞƐƚŝůůůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐƚŚŝƐ ? ? ?hĚĞƐŬ
officer)
 “tĞŚĂǀĞŚĞĂƌĚĂůŽƚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞZW ?ďƵƚǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚ
ŬŶŽǁŚŽǁƚŽĚŽŝƚ ?tĞƐŚŽƵůĚǁŽƌŬŽŶƚŚŝƐƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ? ?hĚĞƐŬŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?
 “General principles set out in the CRPD have come ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌƐ ? ? ? ?
It is difficult to monitor results without indicators, because they often 




 <ĞǇĂŝŵŝƐƚŚĞ “ƌĞƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚĂ “ĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶ
ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ?ďƵƚƵŶĐůĞĂƌǁŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞŵĞĂŶĂŶĚŚŽǁƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚďĞ
achieved. 
 Values and principles not articulated, (mis)use of examples from 
abroad. 
 Detailed regulations (e.g. distance from public transport etc.) leave 
little room for local decisions. Possible implications: street-level 
bureaucracy. 
 Uncertainty around key implementation issues (funding and 
ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ “ĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ? ?




 ŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ‘/&<<Kd ?in 
Hungarian), however this was lacking resources and a 
mandate to be a strong actor in the implementation 
process.
 <ĞǇƌŽůĞŽĨ “ŵĞŶƚŽƌŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ?ŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ
implementation at the local level  W Ă “ďůĂĐŬďŽǆ ? ?ŶŽ
leadership to ensure effective implementation, they lack 
power, issues of cooperation at the local level;
 Disjointed: huge delays in programme phases (due to 




 European Commission: hierarchical position, relationship 
adversarial on the political level but close cooperation at 
ůŽǁĞƌůĞǀĞůƐ ? “ƐŽĨƚ ?ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐĂŶĚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶƚŚĞ
involvement of civil society. 
 Government agencies: competencies divided between 3 
actors - no real leadership and competing interests.
 Civil society (DPOs and human rights watchdogs) played 
an important role before the launch of the 
deinstitutionalisation programme but this role was 
reduced during implementation.





 Involvement of DPOs and residents of institutions 
during implementation was scarce, tokenistic
 Monitoring of operational programmes is mandatory 
by DPOs  Whowever, such monitoring is rather ƐǇŵďŽůŝĐĂŶĚŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? “Ğǆ-ƉŽƐƚ ? ?
 However, ad hoc DPO alliances managed to put a halt 
to government attempts to refurbish certain 
institutions
 Resources are not allocated to DPOs for monitoring 
or implementation. 
 “WKƐĂƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƚŚĞŽŶĞƐǁŚŽƵƐƵĂůǇƌĂŝƐĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂŶĚ




 WŽůŝĐǇŝƐ ‘ĨƵǌǌǇ ?ĂŶĚĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐ ?ƐĞĞEĞĞĚŚĂŵ
2011). Unclear if this is purposive or not, but it 
helps to reconcile differences between actors  WďƌŽĂĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌ “ĚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
 Critical analysis has highlighted areas where 
changes could make major improvements to 
policy implementation. 
 Implementation resonates with the concept of 
Post-socialist Disability Matrix (Mladenov 2016)
 Similarities and differences compared to other 
countries  Wmore comparative research needed.
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